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Abstract—We investigate coexistence of an age optimizing
network (AON) and a throughput optimizing network (TON)
that access the same wireless spectrum band using a WiFi-like
CSMA/CA based access. We consider two modes of long run
coexistence: (a) networks compete with each other for spectrum
access causing them to interfere and (b) networks cooperate and
achieve non-interfering access.
To model competition, we define a non-cooperative stage game
parameterized by average age of the AON at the beginning of the
stage, derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), and
analyze the evolution of age and throughput over an infinitely
repeated game in which each network plays the MSNE in every
stage. Cooperation has a coordination device use a coin toss
during each stage to select the network that must access the
medium. Networks use the grim trigger punishment strategy,
reverting to playing the MSNE every stage forever, if the other
disobeys the device. We determine if there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium, that is the networks obey the device forever
as they find cooperation beneficial.
We find that networks choose to cooperate only when they
have a small enough number of nodes. Else, they would rather
disobey the device and compete.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices has led
to the emergence of applications that require these devices to
sense and communicate information (status updates) to a mon-
itoring facility, or share with other devices, in a timely manner.
These applications include real-time monitoring for disaster
management, environmental monitoring and surveillance [1,
references therein], which require timely delivery of updates
to a ground station, and vehicular communications for safety,
where each vehicle broadcasts its status (for example, position
and velocity) so that they have timely information about each
other to enable applications like collision avoidance [2].
Such networks often share the wireless spectrum with
WiFi networks. For instance, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) in the US opened up the 5.85 − 5.925
GHz band, previously reserved for vehicular communication,
for use by high throughput WiFi (802.11 ac) devices, leading
to the possibility of coexistence between WiFi and vehicular
networks [3]. Similarly, IoT devices like Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs), equipped with 802.11 a/b/g/n technology,
operate in the 2.4 and 5 GHz bands in use by WiFi networks.
While a network of IoT devices would like to optimize
freshness of status updates, a WiFi network would like to
provide high throughputs for its users. We quantify freshness
using the metric of age of information [4] and refer to the
former network as an age optimizing network (AON) and to
the latter as a throughput optimizing network (TON).
In this work, we investigate coexistence of an AON and a
TON from a MAC layer perspective when both networks use
a WiFi-like CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access with
Collision Avoidance) based wireless medium access to share
a common spectrum resource. We analyze coexistence using a
repeated game theoretic approach, where in each CSMA/CA
slot is one stage of the game. We assume networks are selfish
players and aim to optimize their utilities in the long run.
While an AON wants to minimize the discounted sum average
age of updates of its nodes (at a monitor), a TON wants to
maximize the discounted sum average throughput.
We consider two modes of coexistence namely competition
and cooperation. The former has nodes in the networks
probabilistically interfere with those of the other as they access
the shared medium. When cooperating, a coordination device
schedules the networks to access the medium such that nodes
belonging to different networks don’t interfere with each other.
While one may view such cooperation as a coexistence scheme
in its own right, more importantly it serves as a ploy that helps
illuminate the surprising desirability of competition between
an AON and a TON. This, as we will reveal in detail, is
explained by the interplay of the networks as they attempt
to optimize their distinct utilities.
When competing, the interaction between an AON and a
TON in each CSMA/CA slot is modeled as a non-cooperative
stage game. We define the stage game and derive it’s mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). Our stage game is param-
eterized by the average age of the AON at the beginning of the
stage. This captures the fact that age at the end of a stage is a
function of the age at the beginning. Our analysis shows that
the equilibrium strategy of the AON in each stage is a function
of the average age seen at the beginning of the stage and the
number of nodes in the networks, whereas, that of the TON is
static and only a function of the number of nodes in its own
network. We study the evolution of the equilibrium strategies
over time, when players play the MSNE in each stage of the
repeated game, and the resulting utilities of the networks.
We enable cooperation by introducing a coordination de-
vice, which uses a coin toss in every stage to recommend
who between the AON and TON must access the medium
during the slot. Also, a network punishes the other network
in case the other does not adhere to the recommendation of
the device. Specifically, it use a grim trigger that has both the
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2networks revert to using the MSNE every stage following the
stage in which the other network disobeys the device. One
would expect the threat of this punishment to have networks
always obey the device if in fact they preferred cooperation
to competition. We identify when networks prefer cooperation
by checking if the strategy profile that results by obeying the
device forms a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) [5].
We apply our models for competition and cooperation to
two cases of practical interest [6] (a) when networks use
the basic access mechanism, and (b) when networks use the
RTS/CTS based access mechanism. The former has collision
slots (more than one node accesses the channel leading to all
transmissions in error) that are at least as large as slots that
see a successful (interference free) transmission by exactly
one node. In the latter, collision slots are much smaller than
a successful transmission slot. We show that for both the
mechanisms the networks prefer cooperation when the number
of nodes in them are small enough. However, as the number
of nodes become larger, networks prefer competition.
Specifically, when networks use the basic access mecha-
nism, TON finds competition more favorable than cooperation
and when networks use the RTS/CTS based access mechanism,
AON prefers competition over cooperation. When networks
use the basic access mechanism, occasionally all AON nodes
refrain from transmitting during a stage. If competing, such
stages allow the TON interference free access to the medium.
If cooperating, such stages are not available to the TON.
Thus, competing improves TON’s payoff. In contrast, when
using RTS/CTS, the AON nodes see benefit in accessing
the medium aggressively. As a result, competition improves
the AON payoff. However, the TON payoff reduces due to
increased contention from nodes in the AON.
Next, in Section II, we give an overview of related works. In
Section III we describe the network model. This is followed
by Section IV in which we discuss the formulation of the
non-cooperative stage game, derive the mixed strategy Nash
Equilibrium (MSNE) and analyze the repeated game with
competition. We describe the proposed coexistence etiquette
in detail in Section V. Computational analysis is carried out
in Section VI where we describe the evaluation setup and also
state our main results. We conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Recent works such as [3], [7]–[11] study the coexistence
of DSRC based vehicular networks and WiFi. In [7] authors
provide an overview of 5.9 GHz band sharing and discuss
coexistence solutions that protect DSRC users. In [8] authors
study the coexistence scenario of Wireless Access in Vehic-
ular Environment (WAVE) systems with WiFi and propose
a combined control of interframe space and the receiver
sensitivity on the WiFi devices to resolve the hidden terminal
problem and bandwidth competition. In [9] authors evaluate
the performance of two spectrum sharing mechanisms, i.e.,
detect & vacate and detect & mitigate, identify the delayed
detection problem and propose addition of an extra idle period
to the WiFi interframe idle periods to improve the detection
performance. In [3] and [10] authors study the impact of
DSRC on WiFi and vice versa.
In these earlier works authors provide an in-depth study
of the inherent differences between the two technologies,
the coexistence challenges and propose solutions to better
coexistence. However, the aforementioned works look at the
coexistence of DSRC and WiFi as the coexistence of two
CSMA/CA based networks, with different MAC parameters,
where the packets of the DSRC network take precedence over
that of the WiFi network. Also, authors in [3], [7]–[11] propose
tweaking the MAC parameters of the WiFi network in order to
protect the DSRC network. In contrast to [3], [7]–[11], we look
at the coexistence problem as that of coexistence of networks
which have equal access rights to the spectrum, use similar
access mechanisms but have different objectives.
UAVs equipped with 802.11 a/b/g/n technology operate in
the 2.4 and 5 GHz bands coexist with WiFi networks and
are commonly used in real-time monitoring systems such as
disaster management, environmental monitoring and surveil-
lance [1], all of which rely on freshness of updates. Authors
in [12] and [13] consider UAV applications with delay and
achievable throughput as the performance metric. In contrast
to [12] and [13], we employ the age of information metric,
which adequately captures the freshness of updates critical to
the aforementioned applications.
Works such as [14]–[16] investigate age of information in
wireless networks. In [14] authors study optimal control of
status updates from a source to a remote monitor via a network
server to ensure data freshness. In [16], the author evaluates an
updating policy between a source and a service facility using
the status age timeliness metric and shows that a lazy updating
policy is better than just in time updates as the latter wastes
time in sending non-informative updates. In [15], authors
analyze the age of information over multiaccess channels.
In [4], authors investigate minimizing the age of status updates
sent by vehicles over a carrier-sense multiple access (CSMA)
network. As the main objective of the AON is the timely
delivery of information, similar to [14]–[16], we also employ
the metric of age to evaluate the performance of the AON.
Note that while throughput as the payoff function has been
extensively studied from the game theoretic point of view
(for example, see [17], [18]), age as a payoff function has
not garnered much attention yet. In [19] and [20], authors
study an adversarial setting where one player aims to maintain
the freshness of information updates while the other player
aims to prevent this. Also, in our preliminary work [21], we
propose a game theoretic approach to study the coexistence of
DSRC (Dedicated Short Range communication) aka vehicular
communications and WiFi, where the DSRC network desires
to minimize the time-average age of information and the WiFi
network aims to maximize the average throughput. We studied
the one-shot game and evaluated the Nash and Stackelberg
equilibrium strategies. However, the model in [21] did not
capture well the interaction of networks, evolution of their
respective strategies and payoffs over time, which the repeated
game model allows us to capture in this work. In this work,
via the repeated game model we are able to shed better
light on the AON-TON interaction and how their different
utilities distinguish their coexistence from the coexistence of
two utility maximizing CSMA/CA based networks.
3Works such as [22]–[24] have employed repeated games
in the context of coexistence. Since repeated games might
foster cooperation, authors in [22] study a punishment-based
repeated game to model cooperation between multiple net-
works in an unlicensed band and illustrate that under certain
conditions selfish behavior incur negligible losses and whether
the systems cooperate or not does not have much influence
on the performance. Similar to [22], authors in [23] study a
punishment-based repeated game to incorporate cooperation,
however, they also propose mechanisms to ensure user hon-
esty. Contrary to the above works, where coexisting networks
have similar objectives and the equilibrium strategies are static
in each stage, networks in our work have different objectives
and the equilibrium strategies, particularly that of the AON,
as we show later, is dynamic and evolves over stages.
III. NETWORK MODEL
Our network consists of NA age optimizing and NT
throughput optimizing nodes that contend for access to the
shared wireless medium.
Both AON and TON nodes use a CSMA/CA based access
mechanism in which nodes use contention windows (CW) and
one or more backoff stages to gain access to the medium1.
We model this mechanism as in [6]. In this section, network
represents a group of nodes that contend for the medium
without reference to whether the nodes belong to the AON
or the TON. We define events and probabilities that will
appear in the context of both competitive and cooperative
mode. We assume that all nodes can sense each other’s
packet transmissions. This allows modeling the CSMA/CA
mechanism as a slotted multiaccess system. A slot may be an
idle slot in which no node transmits a packet or it may be a slot
that sees a successful transmission. This happens when exactly
one node transmits. If more than one node transmits, none of
the transmissions are successfully decoded and the slot sees
a collision. Further, we assume that all nodes always have a
packet to send. The modeling in [6] shows that the CSMA/CA
settings of minimum contention window (CWmin), number of
backoff stages and the number of nodes can be mapped to the
probability with which a node attempts transmission in a slot.
We use this probability to calculate the other probabilities of
interest.
Let pI be the probability of an idle slot, which is a slot
in which no node transmits. Let p(i)S be the probability of a
successful transmission by node i in a slot and let pS be the
probability of a successful transmission in a slot. We say that
node i sees a busy slot if in the slot node i doesn’t transmit and
exactly one other node transmits. Let p(−i)S be the probability
that a busy slot is seen by node i. Let pC be the probability
that a collision occurs in a slot.
Let σI , σS and σC denote the lengths of an idle, successful,
and collision slot, respectively. In this work, we study two
1In CSMA/CA, nodes employ a window based backoff mechanism to gain
access to the medium. The node first senses the medium and if the medium is
busy it chooses a backoff time uniformly from the interval [0, w−1], where
w is set equal to CWmin. The interval is doubled after each unsuccessful
transmission until the value equals CWmax = 2mCWmin, where m is
the maximum backoff stage.
scenarios of practical interest (a) when networks use the basic
access mechanism and σS ≤ σC and (b) when networks use
the RTS/CTS based access mechanism and σS > σC.
Next we define the throughput of a TON node and the
age of an AON node, respectively, in terms of the above
probabilities and slot lengths. We will detail the calculation
of these probabilities for the competitive and the cooperative
mode in Section IV and Section V, respectively.
A. Throughput of a TON node over a slot
Let the rate of transmission be fixed to r bits/sec in any slot.
Define the throughput Γi of a TON node i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,NT}
in a slot as the number of bits transmitted successfully in the
slot. This is a random variable with probability mass function
(PMF)
P [Γi = γ] =

p
(i)
S γ = σSr,
1− p(i)S γ = 0,
0 otherwise.
(1)
Using (1), we define the average throughput Γ˜i of node i as
Γ˜i = p
(i)
S σSr. (2)
The average throughput of the TON in a slot is
Γ˜ =
1
NT
NT∑
i=1
Γ˜i. (3)
We assume that the throughput in a slot is independent of that
in the previous slots.
B. Age of an AON node over a slot
Let ∆i(t) be the status update age of an AON node i ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,NA} at other nodes in the AON at time t. When the
freshest update of node i at AON node j ∈ {1, 2 . . . ,NA}\i at
time t is time-stamped u(t), the status update age, or simply
the age, of node i at node j is defined as ∆i(t) = t−u(t). We
assume that a status update packet that AON node i attempts
to transmit in a slot contains an update that is fresh at the
beginning of the slot. As a result, node i’s age at any other
node j either resets to σS if a successful transmission occurs
or increases by σI, σC or σS at all other nodes in the AON,
respectively, when an idle slot, collision slot or a busy slot
occurs. Note that node i’s age at the end of a slot is determined
by its age at the beginning of the slot and the type of the slot.
Figure 1 shows an example sample path of the age ∆i(t) of
an AON node i. In what follows we will drop the explicit
mention of time t and let ∆i be the age at the end and ∆−i
be the age at the beginning of a given slot of node i.
The age ∆i, observed by node i at the end of a slot is
thus a random variable with PMF conditioned on age at the
beginning of a slot given by
P [∆i = δi|∆−i = δ−i ] =

pI δi = δ
−
i + σI,
pC δi = δ
−
i + σC,
p
(−i)
S δi = δ
−
i + σS,
p
(i)
S δi = σS,
0 otherwise.
(4)
4∆i(t)
σS
∆i(0)
t1 t2 t3 tn tn+1t4 t5 t
Fig. 1: AON node i’s sample path of age ∆i(t). ∆i(0) is the initial
age. A successful transmission resets the age to σS. The time instants
tn, where, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . }, show the slot boundaries. The slot lengths
are determined by the type of slot.
Using (4), we define the conditional expected age
∆˜i
∆
= E[∆i = δi|∆−i = δ−i ].
= (1− p(i)S )δ−i + (pIσI + pSσS + pCσC). (5)
The average age of status updates of nodes in an AON at the
end of the slot, is
∆˜ =
1
NA
NA∑
i=1
∆˜i. (6)
IV. THE REPEATED GAME
We define a repeated game to model the interaction between
an AON and a TON. In every CSMA/CA slot, networks must
compete for access with the goal of maximizing their expected
payoff over an infinite horizon (a countably infinite number of
slots). We capture the interaction in a slot as a non-cooperative
stage game GNC, where NC stands for non-cooperation or
competition and derive it’s mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
(MSNE). The interaction over the infinite horizon is modeled
as the stage game played repeatedly in every slot and is
denoted by G∞
NC
. For each access mechanism, i.e. basic access
and RTS/CTS, we study the effects of competition in G∞
NC
,
when networks choose to play the MSNE in each stage. Next,
we discuss these in detail.
A. Stage game
We define a parameterized strategic one-shot game [25]
GNC = (N , (Sk)k∈N , (uk)k∈N , ∆˜−), where N is the set of
players, Sk is the set of pure strategies of player k, uk is the
payoff of player k and ∆˜− is the additional parameter input
to the game GNC, which is the average age (6) of the AON
seen at the beginning of the slot. We define the game GNC in
detail.
• Players: The AON and the TON are the two player. We
denote the former by A and the latter by T. Specifically,
we have N = {A,T}.
• Strategy: Let T denote transmit and I denote idle. For
AON comprising of NA nodes, the set of pure strategies is
SA , S1 × S2 × · · · × SNA , where Si = {T , I} is the set
of strategies for a certain AON node i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,NA}.
Similarly, for the TON comprising of NT nodes, the set of
pure strategies is ST , S1 × S2 × · · · × SNT .
We allow networks to play mixed strategies. In general,
for the strategic game GNC, we can define Φk as the set
of all probability distributions over the set of strategies
Sk of player k, where k ∈ N . A mixed strategy for
player k is an element φk ∈ Φk, such that φk is a
probability distribution over Sk. For example, for AON
with NA = 2, the set of pure strategies for AON is
SA = S1 × S2 = {(T , T ), (T , I), (I, T ), (I, I)} and the
probability distribution over SA is φA, such that φA(sA) ≥ 0
for all sA ∈ SA and
∑
sA∈SA φA(sA) = 1.
In this work, we restrict ourselves to the space of probability
distributions such that the mixed strategies of AON are
a function of τA and that of TON are a function of τT,
where τA and τT, are the probabilities with which nodes
in AON and TON, respectively, attempt transmission in a
slot. Specifically, we force all the nodes to choose the same
probability to attempt transmission. As a result, the proba-
bility distribution for AON with NA = 2, parameterized by
τA, is φA(τA) = {τ2A, τA(1 − τA), (1 − τA)τA, (1 − τA)2},
corresponding to the set of pure strategies SA for the AON.
Similarly, for TON with NT = 2, the probability distribution
parameterized by τT, is φT(τT) = {τ2T, τT(1 − τT), (1 −
τT)τT, (1−τT)2}, corresponding to the set of pure strategies
ST for the TON.
• Payoffs: We have NT throughput optimizing nodes that
attempt transmission with probablity τT and NA age op-
timizing nodes that attempt transmission with probability
τA. For the non-cooperative game GNC, let pI,NC be the
probability of an idle slot, where as stated earlier,NC stands
for non-cooperation or competition. We have
pI,NC = (1− τA)NA(1− τT)NT . (7)
Let pS,NC be the probability of a successful transmission in
a slot, p(i)S,NC be the probability of a successful transmission
by node i, p(−i)S,NC be the probability of a busy slot. We have
pS,NC = NAτA(1− τA)(NA−1)(1− τT)NT
+ NTτT(1− τT)(NT−1)(1− τA)NA , (8)
p
(i)
S,NC =
{
τA(1− τA)(NA−1)(1− τT)NT , ∀i ∈ NA,
τT(1− τT)(NT−1)(1− τA)NA , ∀i ∈ NT.
(9)
p
(−i)
S,NC =

(NA − 1)τA(1− τA)(NA−1)(1− τT)NT
+NTτT(1− τT)(NT−1)(1− τA)NA ,
∀i ∈ NA,
(NT − 1)τT(1− τT)(NT−1)(1− τA)NA
+NAτA(1− τA)(NA−1)(1− τT)NT ,
∀i ∈ NT.
(10)
The probabilities (7)-(10) can be substituted in (1)-(2)
and (4)-(5), respectively, to calculate the average through-
put (3) and average age (6). We use these to obtain the stage
payoffs uT,NC and uA,NC of the TON and the AON. They
5−(∆0 + σC), 0
−(∆0 + σS), σS
−σS, 0
−(∆0 + σI), 0
T I
T
IA(
A
O
N
)
T(TON)
(a)
−2.02, 0
−2.02, 1.01
−1.01, 0
−1.02, 0
T I
T
IA(
A
O
N
)
T(TON)
(b)
Fig. 2: Payoff matrix for the game GNC, when both AON and TON
have exactly one node each and can choose between transmit (T ) and
idle (I). (a) Shows the payoff matrix with slot lengths and age at the
end of the stage 1. Negative payoffs for player A (AON) indicates
that the networks desire to minimize its utility. (b) Shows the payoff
matrix obtained by substituting σS = σC = 1 +β and σI = β, where
∆0 = 1 + β and β = 0.01. (T , T ), (T , I) and (I, T ) are the pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
are
uT,NC(τA, τT) = Γ˜(τA, τT), (11)
uA,NC(τA, τT) = −∆˜(τA, τT). (12)
The networks would like to maximize their payoffs.
B. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Figure 2 shows the payoff matrix corresponding to the non-
cooperative stage game GNC. Each network consist of a single
node and can choose between pure strategies, transmit (T )
and idle (I). As stated in [25], every finite non-cooperative
game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). For the
game GNC defined in Section IV-A, a mixed-strategy profile
φ∗(τ∗A, τ
∗
T) = (φ
∗
A(τ
∗
A), φ
∗
T(τ
∗
T)) is a Nash equilibrium [25],
if φ∗A(τ
∗
A) and φ
∗
T (τ
∗
T) are the best responses of player A and
player T, to their respective opponents’ mixed strategy, i.e.,
φ∗T (τ
∗
T) ∈ ΦT and φ∗A(τ∗A) ∈ ΦA, respectively. We have
uT,NC(φ
∗
A, φ
∗
T ) ≥ uT,NC(φ∗A, φT ), ∀φT ∈ ΦT ,
uA,NC(φ
∗
A, φ
∗
T ) ≥ uA,NC(φA, φ∗T ), ∀φA ∈ ΦA,
where φ∗(τ∗A, τ
∗
T) ∈ Φ =
∏|N |
k=1 Φk is the profile of
mixed strategy. Since the probability distributions φA(τA) and
φT(τT) are parameterized by τA and τT, respectively, we find
τ = [τ∗A, τ
∗
T], in Proposition 1, to compute the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. The parameter τ = [τ∗A, τ∗T] required to
compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium φ∗(τ∗A, τ
∗
T) =
(φ∗A(τ
∗
A), φ
∗
T(τ
∗
T)), for the game GNC is
τ
∗
A =

(1− τ∗T)(∆˜− − NA(σS − σI)) + NANTτ∗T(σS − σC)(
(1− τ∗T)NA(∆˜− + (σI − σC)− NA(σS − σC))
+ NANTτ
∗
T(σS − σC)
)
∆˜
−
> ∆th,
1 ∆˜
−
< ∆th & ∆th = ∆th,1,
0 ∆˜
−
< ∆th & ∆th = ∆th,0.
(13a)
τ
∗
T =
1
NT
. (13b)
where, ∆th = max{∆th,0,∆th,1}, ∆th,0 = NA(σS − σI) −
NANTτ
∗
T(σS−σC)
(1−τ∗T) and ∆th,1 = NA(σS − σC).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
As shown in (13a) and (13b), τ∗A in any slot is a function
of average age observed at the beginning of the slot, i.e., ∆˜−,
the number of nodes in both the AON and the TON and
τ∗T, whereas, τ
∗
T is a function of nodes in the TON and is
indepedent of the number of nodes in the AON. The threshold
value ∆th can either take a value equal to ∆th,0 or ∆th,1.
For instance, when NA = 1, NT = 1, and σS = σC, the
threshold value ∆th is equal to ∆th,0 = (σS − σI), and since
the minimum value that ∆˜− can take is σS, i.e., the age when
a successful transmission takes place and age is reset, ∆˜− is
always greater than ∆th, resulting in τ∗A = 1. Similarly, when
NA = 1, NT = 1, and σS > σC, the threshold value ∆th
is equal to ∆th,1 = (σS − σC), which is again less than the
minimum value σS that ∆˜− can take, resulting in τ∗A = 1. In
contrast to the prior scenarios where σS ≥ σC, when NA = 1,
NT = 1, and σS < σC, the threshold value ∆th is equal to
∆th,0 = ∞ and since ∆˜− can not exceed ∞, τ∗A in this case
is 0. Note that while the parameter τ∗T corresponding to the
TON is equal to 1 for all selections of σC, the AON chooses
τ∗A = 1 when σS ≥ σC, and τ∗A = 0 when σS < σC. This is
because when σS > σC the increase in age due to a successful
transmission by the TON, which has τ∗T = 1, is less than that
due to a collision which would have happened if the AON
chose τ∗A = 1. Corollary 1 gives the value of σC for which
∆th = ∆th,0 and τ∗A = [0, 1) and ∆th = ∆th,1 and τ
∗
A ∈ (0, 1],
when NA > 1 and NT > 1.
Corollary 1. In the game GNC, the parameter τ∗A required to
compute the MSNE of the AON φ∗A, lies in the interval (0, 1] if
σC <
σI+τ
∗
T(NTσS−σI)
1+τ∗T(NT−1) , otherwise, takes values in the interval
[0, 1).
Proof: For τ∗A ∈ (0, 1], ∆th in (13a) should be equal to
∆th,1, i.e., max{∆th,1,∆th,0} = ∆th,1, hence implying ∆th,1 >
∆th,0. On substituting the values of ∆th,0 and ∆th,1 from (13a)
in the inequality ∆th,1 > ∆th,0, we get σC <
σI+τ
∗
T(NTσS−σI)
1+τ∗T(NT−1) .
Therefore,
τ∗A ∈
 (0, 1] σC <
σI + τ
∗
T(NTσS − σI)
1 + τ∗T(NT − 1)
,
[0, 1) otherwise.
A distinct feature of the stage game is the effect of self-
contention and competition on the network utilities2. We define
self-contention as the impact of nodes within one’s own
network and competition as the impact of nodes in the other
network, respectively, on the network utilities. Figure 3 shows
the affect of self-contention and competition, when networks
play their respective equilibrium strategies. We choose ∆˜− =
∆th,0 + σS as it gives τ∗A ∈ (0, 1) (see (13a)). As shown in
Figure 3a and Figure 3c, while the access probability τ∗T for
the TON is independent of the number of node in the AON,
the payoff of the TON increases as the number of nodes in
the AON increase. Intuitively, since increase in the number of
AON nodes results in increase in competition, the payoff of
the TON should decrease. However, the payoff of the TON
2We had observed self-contention and competition in our earlier work [21]
as well. However, the game in [21] was different from the one we study in
this work.
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Fig. 3: Access probabilities and stage payoff of the TON and the
AON for different selections of NT and NA when networks choose to
play the MSNE. The stage payoff corresponds to ∆˜− = ∆˜−th,0 + σS,
σS = 1 + β, σC = 2(1 + β), σI = β and β = 0.01.
increases. For example, for NT = 2, as shown in Figure 3c,
the payoff of the TON increases from 0.2044 to 0.2451 as
NA increases from 2 to 10. This increase is due to increase in
self-contention within the AON which forces the network to be
conservative. As shown in Figure 3b, the access probability τ∗A
decreases with increase in the number of nodes in the AON.
For NT = 2, τ∗A decreases from 1 to 0.0001 as NA increases
from 1 to 50. This benefits the TON. Similarly as shown in
Figure 3d, as the number of TON nodes increases the payoff
of the AON improves, since the access probability of the TON
decreases as shown in Figure 3a.
For the game GNC, when σS = σC, the access probabilities
τ∗A and τ
∗
T required to compute the equilibrium strategies of
AON and TON, respectively, as shown in Corollary 2, are
independent of the number of nodes and access probability
of the other network. As a result, the equilibrium strategy of
each network is also its dominant strategy for the case when
σS = σC.
Corollary 2. The parameter τ = [τ∗A, τ∗T] required to
compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium φ∗(τ∗A, τ
∗
T) =
(φ∗A(τ
∗
A), φ
∗
T(τ
∗
T)), obtained by substituting σS = σC in (13a)
is
τ∗A =
{
NA(σI−σS)+∆˜−
NA(σI−σC+∆˜−) ∆˜
− > NA(σS − σI),
0 otherwise .
(14a)
τ∗T =
1
NT
. (14b)
As seen in (14a) and (14b), the access probabilities τ∗A and
τ∗T required to compute the equilibrium strategies of the AON
and the TON, respectively, when σS = σC are independent
of the number of nodes and access probability of the other
network As a result, the equilibrium strategy of each network
is also its dominant strategy.
C. Repeated game
As the networks coexist over a long period of time, we
consider an infinitely repeated game, defined as G∞
NC
, in
which the one-shot game GNC, where, players play the
MSNE (13), is played in every stage (slot) n ∈ {1, 2, . . . }.
We consider perfect monitoring [25], i.e., at the end of each
stage, all players observe the action profile chosen by every
other player3. In addition to the action profiles, players also
observe ∆˜−n , i.e., the average age of the AON at the end of
stage (n−1). The AON equilibrium strategy as shown in (13a)
in any stage is a function of ∆˜−n and the dependence of the
AON equilibrium strategy on it intertwines the utilities of the
networks.
Figure 4 shows the payoffs (see (11)-(12)) and the access
probabilities of the TON and the AON for the repeated game
G∞
NC
when (a) network use the RTS/CTS based access mech-
anism and σS > σC (see Figures 4a-4c) and (b) when networks
use the basic access mechanism and σS ≤ σC (see Figures 4d-
4f for σS = σC and Figures 4g-4i for σS < σC). The results
correspond to a AON-TON coexistence with NA = NT = 5.
Figures 4a-4b, Figures 4d-4e and Figures 4g-4h illustrates
the interlink between the access probability and age of the
AON for different selections of σC. As shown in (13a)
and (14a), τ∗A, is a function of age observed in the beginning
of a stage. The threshold values in (13a), i.e., ∆th,0 and ∆th,1,
for NA = NT = 5, σS = 1 + β, σC = 0.1σS, σI = β and
β = 0.01 are −0.6812 and 4.5450, respectively, resulting in
∆th = max{∆th,0,∆th,1} = 4.5450. As a result, nodes in the
AON access the medium with τ∗A ∈ (0, 1) in any stage n only
if the average age in the (n− 1)th stage exceeds a threshold
value, i.e., ∆˜−n > ∆th, otherwise τ
∗
A = 1. For instance, in
Figure 4a, τ∗A = 1 for n ∈ [1, 36] since ∆˜−n < 4.5450.
However, for n = 37, τ∗A = 0.9295 as ∆˜
−
37 = 4.6460 exceeds
the threshold value. Similarly, the threshold value in (14a),
when σS = σC, is NA(σS − σI) = 5. As a result, as shown
in Figure 4d, nodes in the AON access the medium with
τ∗A ∈ (0, 1) in any stage n only if the average age in the
(n − 1)th stage exceeds the threshold value, i.e., ∆˜−n > 5,
otherwise τ∗A = 0.
Note that when σS ≤ σC, nodes in the AON as shown in Fig-
ure 4d and Figure 4g, occasionally refrain from transmission,
i.e., choose τ∗A = 0 during a stage. In contrast, when σS > σC,
nodes in the AON as shown in Figure 4a, often access the
medium aggressively, i.e., with τ∗A = 1 during a stage. Such
a behavior of nodes in the AON is due to the presence of
the TON. As the length of the collision slot decreases, the
impact of collision on the age of the AON reduces. If nodes
in the AON choose to refrain from transmission, the average
age of the AON be a function of the events – successful
transmission, collision or idle slot, happening in the TON,
whereas if nodes in the AON choose to transmit aggressively,
i.e., choose τ∗A = 1, the average age of the AON would only be
3The assumption of perfect monitoring is stronger than that of imperfect
and private monitoring. However, since the basic insight that the equilibria
in repeated games are fundamentally different from the equilibria in stage
game survives any choice of monitoring assumption, for ease of exposition,
we employ the simplest assumption on monitoring structure, i.e., perfect
monitoring, and propose to explore other monitoring assumptions in future.
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Fig. 4: Illustration of per stage access probability τ∗k (k ∈ N ) of the AON and the TON, age ∆(tn) of the AON and throughput
Γ(tn) of the TON wrt stage obtained from a simulation run when σC = 0.1σS (see Figures 4a-4c), σC = σS (see Figures 4d-4f)
and σC = 2σS (see Figures 4g-4i). The results correspond to NA = 5,NT = 5, σS = 1 + β, σI = β and β = 0.01.
impacted by the collision slot. For instance, for a coexistence
scenario with NA = NT = 5, σS = 1+β, σC = 0.1σS, σI = β,
β = 0.01 and ∆˜− = σS, if τ∗A = 0, the average age in the
stage computed using (6) is 1.4535, whereas, if τ∗A = 1, the
average age is 1.1110. As a result, due to reduced impact of
collision, nodes in the AON choose to contend with the TON
aggresively for the medium and hence transmit with τ∗A = 1
during a stage.
Player k’s average discounted payoff for the game G∞
NC
,
where k ∈ N is
Uk,NC = Eφ
{
(1− α)
∞∑
n=1
αn−1uk,NC(φ)
}
, (15)
where, the expectation is taken with respect to the strategy
profile φ, uk,NC(φ) is player k’s payoff in stage n and
0 < α < 1 is the discount factor. Note that a discount
factor α closer to 1 means that the player values not only
the stage payoff but also the payoff in the future, i.e., the
player is far-sighted, whereas α closer to 0 means that the
player is myopic and values only the current payoff. By
substituting (12) and (11) in (15), we can obtain the average
discounted payoffs UA,NC and UT,NC of the AON and the
TON, respectively.
V. THE REPEATED GAME WITH COOPERATION
In general, selfish players choose the one-shot game
MSNE (13). However, if they cooperate, they may achieve
higher expected one-shot payoffs. For instance, consider the 2-
player one-shot game shown in Figure 2b. Figure 5 shows the
convex hull of payoffs corresponding to it. The game has three
pure strategy Nash Equilibria, i.e., (T , T ), (T , I) and (I, T )
and a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium, i.e., φ∗A = {1, 0}
and φ∗T = {1, 0}. Consider a coordination device which is
identified with probability PR and whose recommendation is
based on the flip of a fair coin such that PR = P[H] and
(1 − PR) = P[T]. This coordination device recommends the
AON to play transmit (T ) if Heads (H) shows and play idle
(I) if Tails (T) shows, whereas, recommends the TON to
do the vice versa, i.e., play idle (I) if Heads (H) shows
and transmit (T ) if Tails (T) show. If the players comply
with the recommendation of the coordination device identified
with PR = (1 − PR) = 0.5, the expected payoff of AON is
(−1.01× PR − 2.02× (1− PR)) = −1.515 and that of TON
is (0 × PR + 1.01 × (1 − PR)) = 0.505, which is more than
what the AON and the TON would get had they played the
MSNE, i.e., −2.02 and 0, respectively.
Based on the above observations, we define a simple coexis-
tence etiquette that enables cooperation between an AON and
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Fig. 5: The convex hull of payoffs for the 2-player one-shot game
(see Figure 2b).
a TON. Specifically, it employs a coordination device, which
is a randomized signaling device PR, based on the flip of a
biased coin, that issues recommendations to the AON and the
TON to access the spectrum in a non-overlapping manner, that
is one at a time, thereby, eliminating the impact of competition
and leaving the networks to deal with self-contention only. We
consider
• The probability PR and (1 − PR), i.e., P[H] and P[T],
respectively, are common knowledge to players.
• The recommendations issued to the players are
– AON: play transmit (T ) if you are told that H has occured
and play idle (I) otherwise.
– TON: play transmit (T ) if you are told that T has occured
and play idle (I) otherwise.
• The above recommendations are common knowledge to
players.
While networks get an incentive to cooperate, they are
punished if they are non-compliant of the recommendation
of the coordination device. The proposed etiquette uses grim
trigger strategies, which are the harshest punishment strategies
in the class of Nash-reversion punishment strategies, to enforce
cooperation. That is, if in any stage, one or both networks do
not comply to the recommendation of the coordination device,
the networks play their respective equilibrium strategies in
each stage thereafter.
Further, we check if the cooperation strategy profile pro-
posed under the coexistence etiquette is self-enforceable and
if networks would comply to the recommendation of the
coordination device under the threat of punishment. We con-
firm this by checking if the strategy profile proposed under
the coexistence etiquette form a subgame-perfect equilibrium
(SPE), i.e., we check that no player would want to deviate
unilaterally at any stage of the game. We employ the one-shot
deviation principle to do so.
A. Modeling cooperation between networks
We begin by modifying the network model defined in Sec-
tion III to incorporate the recommendation of the coordination
device PR. As stated earlier, PR denotes the chance for nodes
in the AON to transmit and (1 − PR) denotes the chance for
nodes in the TON to transmit, while nodes in the competing
network stays idle. Let τ̂A and τ̂T denote the optimal access
probability for nodes in the AON and TON, respectively.
Proposition 2. The optimal strategy τ̂ = [τ̂A, τ̂T ] of the one-
shot game GC when networks cooperate is
τ̂A =

∆˜− −NA(σS − σI)
NA(∆˜− + (σI − σC)−NA(σS − σC))
∆˜− > ∆th,
1 ∆˜− < ∆th & ∆th = ∆th,1,
0 ∆˜− < ∆th & ∆th = ∆th,0.
(16a)
τ̂T =
1
NT
. (16b)
where, ∆th = max{∆th,0,∆th,1}, ∆th,0 = NA(σS − σI) and
∆th,1 = NA(σS − σC).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
Similar to (13a), the optimal strategy τ̂A (16a) in any slot
is a function of average age observed at the beginning of the
slot, i.e., ∆˜−. However, in contrast to (13a), in the cooperative
game GC, the optimal strategy τ̂A of the AON is a function
of only the number of nodes in its own network, since the
coordination device allows networks to access the medium
one at a time. Similarly, the optimal strategy τ̂T of the TON
is a function of the number of nodes in its own network and is
indepedent of the number of nodes in the AON. The threshold
value ∆th can either take a value equal to ∆th,0 or ∆th,1. For
instance, when NA = 1, NT = 1 and σS = σC, ∆th takes a
value equal to ∆th,0 = (σS − σI) and since ∆˜− can only be
equal to or greater than σS, which is larger than (σS−σI), the
AON chooses τ̂A = 1.
Let pI,C be the probability of an idle slot
pI,C = PR(1− τ̂A)NA + (1− PR)(1− τ̂T )NT . (17)
Similarly, let pS,C be the probability of a successful trans-
mission in a slot, p(i)S,C be the probability of a successful
transmission by node i, p(−i)S,C be the probability of a busy
slot. We have
pS,C = PRNAτ̂A(1− τ̂A)(NA−1)
+ (1− PR)NTτ̂T (1− τ̂T )(NT−1), (18)
p
(i)
S,C =
{
PRτ̂A(1− τ̂A)(NA−1), ∀i ∈ NA,
(1− PR)τ̂T (1− τ̂T )(NT−1), ∀i ∈ NT,
(19)
p
(−i)
S,C =

(1− PR)NTτ̂T (1− τ̂T )(NT−1)
+ PR(NA − 1)τ̂A(1− τ̂A)(NA−1), ∀i ∈ NA,
(1− PR)(NT − 1)τ̂T (1− τ̂T )(NT−1)
+ PRNAτ̂A(1− τ̂A)(NA−1), ∀i ∈ NT.
(20)
pC,C = 1− pS,C − pI,C. (21)
By substituting (17)-(21) in (3) and (6), we can obtain the stage
utility of the TON and the AON, defined in (11) and (12),
respectively, when networks cooperate. The resulting stage
utility of the TON and the AON are
uT,C(τ̂A, τ̂T ) = Γ˜(τ̂A, τ̂T ), (22)
uA,C(τ̂A, τ̂T ) = −∆˜(τ̂A, τ̂T ). (23)
9Similar to the non-cooperative game GNC, networks in the
cooperative game GC would also like to maximize their
payoffs.
B. Repeated game with cooperating networks
Contrary to the game defined in Section IV-C, where
networks play the MSNE in each stage, we define an infinitely
repeated game G∞
C
where networks cooperate and comply to
the recommendation of the coordination device PR in each
stage. The course of action that the networks follow is as
follows: Players in the begining of each stage receive a recom-
mendation H or T from the coordination device PR. In addition
to the recommendation, players observe the action profile
which comprises of player’s own action and the action of the
other player in the previous stage. Consider the following grim
trigger strategy profile defined inductively
an =

(T , I) if an−1 ∈ {(T , I),(I, T )} and Rn = H,
(I, T ) if an−1 ∈ {(T , I),(I, T )} and Rn = T,
(φ∗A, φ
∗
T ) otherwise.
(24)
where, an−1, is the action profile observed by the networks in
stage (n−1) and Rn corresponds to the signal from the coordi-
nation device PR. As shown in (24), if an−1 6∈ {(T , I),(I, T )}
networks play (φ∗A, φ
∗
T ).
In a nutshell, cooperation is sustained as long as the players
comply to the recommendation of the coordination device PR.
However, if any player deviates, players revert to playing the
MSNE and stick to it thereafter.
Figure 6 shows the payoffs (22)-(23) and the access prob-
abilities of TON and AON for the repeated game G∞
C
when
(a) network use the RTS/CTS based access mechanism and
σS > σC (Figures 6a-6c), and (b) when networks use the basic
access mechanism and σS ≤ σC (Figures 6d-6f corresponds
to σS = σC and Figures 6g-6i corresponds to σS < σC) .
The results correspond to AON-TON coexistence with NA =
NT = 5 and PR = 0.5.
In contrast to the repeated game in Section IV-C where
nodes in the AON choose to occassionally access the medium
aggressively when σS > σC, in the repeated game G∞C , nodes
in the AON as shown in Figure 6a, Figure 6d and Figure 6g,
irrespective of the length of collision slot, never access the
medium aggressively, i.e., do not choose τ̂A = 1, instead they
occasionally refrain from transmission and choose τ̂A = 0
during a stage. This is due to the absence of contention
from the TON when networks obey the recommendation of
the coordination device. In the absence of contention from
the TON, when nodes in the AON choose to refrain from
transmission, the age of the AON only increases by the length
of an idle slot. Since the benefits of idling surpasses that
of contending aggressively, nodes in the AON occassionally
choose to refrain from transmission irrespective of the length
of collision slot.
C. Is cooperation self-enforceable?
We first validate our choice of the proposed coexistence
etiquette by checking if in a stage game, networks find
cooperation beneficial or not. In other words, we check if
the stage utility of the players when they choose to coop-
erate is more than or atleast as much as that when they
choose to compete, i.e., uT,C(τ̂A, τ̂T ) ≥ uT,NC(τ∗A, τ∗T) and
uA,C(τ̂A, τ̂T ) ≥ uA,NC(τ∗A, τ∗T). Using these inequalities, we
determine the range of PR, as shown in (25), over which
networks prefer cooperation in the stage game.
We find that when NA = 1 and NT = 1, depending on the
length of collision slot σC, the range of PR (25) varies. As
discussed earlier in Section IV, when networks compete and
σS ≥ σC, τ∗A = τ∗T = 1, whereas, when σS < σC, τ∗A = 0 and
τ∗T = 1. In contrast, when NA = 1 and NT = 1, irrespective
of the length of collision slot σC, when networks cooperate,
τ̂A = 1 and τ̂T = 1. As a result, cooperation is beneficial for
PR ∈ [0, 1] when σS ≥ σC, and only beneficial at PR = 0 when
σS < σC. This is because when σS ≥ σC, while networks
see a collision when they compete, they see a successful
transmission if they choose to cooperate. In contrast, when
σS < σC, since the AON chooses not to access the medium
when networks compete, the TON gets a contention free access
to the medium and hence sees a successful transmission. As
a result, the TON only cooperates if the AON doesn’t get
a chance to access the medium under cooperation as well.
Hence, when σS < σC, cooperation is only beneficial if
PR = 0. Note that while the analysis for NA = 1 and NT = 1
as discussed above, is simple, (25) becomes intractable for
NA > 1 and NT > 1. Therefore, we resort to computational
analysis and show that as the number of nodes increases, when
σS ≤ σC, cooperation is beneficial only at PR = 0, whereas,
when σS > σC, it is beneficial only for higher values of PR,
i.e., for PR close to 1. We discuss this in detail in Section VI.
Next we check if the cooperation strategy profile defined
in (24), proposed under the coexistence etiquette, is self-
enforceable and if networks would comply to it under the
threat of punishment. We confirm this by checking if the
proposed path of play form a subgame-perfect equilibrium [5].
In other words, we check that no player would want to deviate
unilaterally at any stage of the game.
We check for any deviations using the one-stage deviation
principle defined as: Consider that in stage 1 the coordina-
tion device sees H and recommends the networks to play
according to the path of play defined in (24). If players
comply to the recommendation in stage 1 and thereafter, the
discounted payoff is UT,C = (1 − α)
∑∞
n=1 α
n−1uT,C and
UA,C = (1 − α)
∑∞
n=1 α
n−1uA,C, respectively, where uT,C
and uA,C are defined in (22) and (23). However, if any network
deviates in stage 1, the grim trigger strategy comes into play,
i.e., networks play the MSNE thereafter. Nevertheless, any
selfish network would not deviate if the payoff earned from
cooperation (C) surpasses that from non-cooperation (NC).
We check if cooperation can be self-enforced by considering
the following four inequalities:
• Case I: R1 = H and a1 = (T , I): Consider in stage 1 the
coordination device sees H and networks are recommended
to follow the strategy (T , I). However, a player can choose
to deviate. The right-hand side of the following two inequal-
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Fig. 6: Illustration of per stage access probability τ̂k (k ∈ N ) of the AON and the TON, age ∆(tn) of the AON and throughput
Γ(tn) of the TON wrt stage obtained from an independent run when σC = 0.1σS (see Figures 6a-6c), σC = σS (see Figures 6d-
6f) and σC = 2σS (see Figures 6g-6i). The results correspond to NA = 5,NT = 5, σS = 1 + β, σI = β, β = 0.01 and
PR = 0.5.
∆˜−p(i)S,NC − (σI − σC)(pI,NC − (1− τ̂T )NT )− (σS − σC)(pS,NC −NT τ̂T (1− τ̂T )NT−1)
∆˜−τ̂A(1− τ̂A)NA−1 − (σI − σC)((1− τ̂A)NA − (1− τ̂T )NT )
− (σS − σC)(NAτ̂A(1− τ̂A)NA−1 −NT τ̂T (1− τ̂T )NT−1)
≤ PR ≤ 1− (1− τ∗A)NA (25)
ities, (26) and (27), correspond to AON choosing to play
idle (I) instead of transmit (T ) and TON choosing to play
transmit (T ) instead of idle (I), respectively. Consequently,
the grim strategy comes into play, resulting in the non-
cooperative discounted payoff denoted by Uk,NC for k ∈ N .
UA,C|{R1=H,a1=(T , I)} ≥ UA,NC|{R1=H,a1=(I, I)}, (26)
UT,C|{R1=H,a1=(T , I)} ≥ UT,NC|{R1=H,a1=(T ,T )}. (27)
The non-cooperative discounted payoffs corresponding
to the AON and the TON in (26) and (27) are
UA,NC|{R1=H,a1=(I, I)} = (1 − α)(∆˜ + σI) + (1 −
α)
∑∞
n=2 α
n−1uA,NC and UT,NC|{R1=H,a1=(T ,T )} = (1−
α)
∑∞
n=2 α
n−1uT,NC, respectively, where uA,NC and
uT,NC are defined in (11) and (12).
• Case II: R1 = T and a1 = (I, T ): We now consider the
scenario when in stage 1 the coordination device sees T
and recommends the networks to play (I, T ). In this case,
the right-hand side of the following two inequalities, (28)
and (29), correspond to AON choosing to play transmit
(T ) instead of idle (I) and TON choosing to play idle (I)
instead of transmit (T ), respectively, and therefore trigger-
ing the grim strategy which results in the non-cooperative
discounted payoff.
UA,C|{R1=T,a1=(I, T )} ≥ UA,NC|{R1=T,a1=(T , T )}, (28)
UT,C|{R1=T,a1=(I, T )} ≥ UT,NC|{R1=T,a1=(I,I)}. (29)
Similar to (26) and (27), the non-cooperative discounted
payoffs corresponding to the AON and the TON in (28)
and (29) are UA,NC|{R1=T,a1=(T , T )} = (1−α)(∆˜ +σC)+
(1− α)∑∞n=2 αn−1uA,NC and UT,NC|{R1=H,a1=(T ,T )} =
(1− α)∑∞n=2 αn−1uT,NC, respectively.
We now formally specify the requirement for cooperation to
be self-enforceable via threat of punishment.
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Statement 1 (Cooperation is self-enforceable). There exists an
α < 1 such that for all α > α, there exists 0 < PR < 1 with the
property that the repeated game G∞
C
has a subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) supported with the coordination device PR
and strategies as specified in (24).
The parameters (α,PR), which makes Statement 1 true can
be computed from the equilibrium incentive constraints (26)-
(29). However, (26)-(29) are not theoretically tractable, there-
fore, we resort to computational analysis. Our analysis, as
discussed in Section VI, shows that the existence of (α,PR)
is dependent on the size of the AON and the TON and they
exist for smaller networks only. In other words, there exist
an SPE with coordination device PR only when the networks
have fewer nodes, whereas, as the size of networks increases,
competition becomes more favorable than cooperation and the
SPE with coordination device PR ceases to exist, therefore,
giving us Proposition 3 which states that
Proposition 3. Statement 1 is true for smaller networks,
however, as the networks grow in size, Statement 1 becomes
false.
VI. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
In this section, we first discuss the simulation setup and
later the results. For what follows, we set σI = β, 0 < β < 1,
and study two scenarios (a) when networks use RTS/CTS
mechanism and σS > σC and (b) when networks use the basic
access mechanism and σS ≤ σC. Specifically, we select (a)
σS = (1 + β), σC = 0.1(1 + β), (b) σS = σC = (1 + β),
and (c) σS = (1 + β), σC = 2(1 + β). In practice, the
idle slot is much smaller than a collision or a successful
transmission slot, that is, β << 1. We select β = 0.01 for
the simulation results discussed ahead. We make different
selections of NA and NT to illustrate the impact of self-
contention and competition. Specifically, we simulate for
NA ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 50} and NT ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 50}. We consider
α ∈ [0.01, 0.99] and PR ∈ [0.01, 0.99] for computing the
discounted payoffs. Different selections of α allow us to study
the behavior of myopic and far-sighted players. We use Monte
Carlo simulations to compute the average discounted payoff of
the AON and the TON. We compute the average over 100, 000
independent runs each comprising of 1000 stages. For each
run, we fix the rate of transmission r for each node in the
WiFi network to 1 bit/sec.
Our objective is to show via simulation if cooperation
between networks is self-enforceable. We first study the impact
of the length of collision slot σC on the average discounted
payoff when (a) networks play the MSNE in each stage and
compete for the medium, and (b) networks obey the recom-
mendation of the coordination device PR in each stage and
hence cooperate. This allows us to understand how the choice
of mechanism, i.e., RTS/CTS or basic access, impacts the
behavior of networks under the competitive and cooperative
mode for different selections of σC. Specifically, we show that
when networks compete, while nodes in the AON occassionaly
choose to refrain from transmitting during a stage under the
basic access mechanism, hence, benefitting the TON, they
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Fig. 7: Average discounted payoff of the TON and the AON for
NT = NA = 5 when networks choose to play MSNE in each
stage. The results are computed over 100, 000 independent runs
with 1000 stages each and correspond to σS = 1 + β, σI = β,
σC = {0.1σS, σS, 2σS} and β = 0.01.
choose to access the medium aggressively under the RTS/CTS
mechanism improving their own payoff. Further, we discuss
the scenarios when cooperation is beneficial in the stage game
and self-enforceable in the repeated game. We show that in the
stage game, when networks use the basic access mechanism,
as the number of nodes in the networks increases, cooperation
is beneficial only at PR = 0, whereas, when networks use the
RTS/CTS mechanism, it is beneficial only for higher values
of PR, i.e., for PR close to 1. Lastly, we illustrate the region
of cooperation, i.e., the range of α and PR for which the
inequalities (26)-(29) are satisfied and the repeated game has
a SPE supported with the coordination device PR. We discuss
how and why cooperation becomes unenforceable and the SPE
ceases to exist in the repeated game as the size of networks
increases.
Impact of σC on network payoffs in repeated game with
competition: The length of collision slot σC impacts the payoff
of the TON and the AON as shown in Figure 7. When
networks use the basic access mechanism and σS ≤ σC, nodes
in the AON occassionaly refrain from transmitting during a
stage. While such stages provide contention free access to the
nodes in the TON and improves its payoff (see Figure 7a), the
age of AON nodes increases, either by σS, σC or σI, depending
on whether nodes in the TON see a successful, collision or idle
slot. However, as the length of the collision slot decreases, i.e.,
when networks use the RTS/CTS mechanism and σS > σC,
nodes in the AON choose to access the medium aggressively,
therefore, improving its payoff (see Figure 7b) and eliminating
the contention free slots available to the TON. As a result,
payoff of the TON decreases with decrease in the length of
the collision slot.
Figure 8 illustrates the empirical frequency of occurence
of τ∗A = 0, τ
∗
A = 1, successful transmission and collision
for different sizes of AON and TON when networks choose
to play the MSNE in each stage. The results correspond to
different selections of σC, i.e., σS = σC and σS > σC.
We skip the results for the case when σS < σC, since the
observations are similar to σS = σC. From Figure 8, we
observe the following: (a) empirical frequency of τ∗A = 0
and τ∗A = 1 increases as the size of networks increases, (b)
empirical frequency of successful transmission decreases with
increase in network size and decrease in σC, and (c) empirical
frequency of collision increases with increase in network size.
As shown in (14a), the age threshold NA(σS−σI) increases
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Fig. 8: Empirical frequency of occurence of τ∗A = 0, τ∗A = 1, successful transmission and collision for different scenarios computed over
100, 000 independent runs with 1000 stages each when networks choose to play the MSNE in each stage. Figure 8a-8d and Figure 8e-8h
correspond to when σS = σC and σS > σC, respectively. The results correspond to σS = 1 + β, σI = β, σC = {0.1σS, σS} and β = 0.01.
with increase in NA. As a result, the frequency of occurence
of τ∗A = 0 increases with NA. Similarly, as shown in (13a), the
age threshold NA(σS−σC) also increases with NA, therefore,
increasing the empirical frequency of τ∗A = 1. We illustrate the
increase in the frequency of occurence of τ∗A = 0 and τ
∗
A = 1
with increasing number of AON nodes in Figure 8a and
Figure 8e, respectively. While the increase in the frequency of
occurence of τ∗A = 0 works in favour of a TON, the increase
in the frequency of occurence of τ∗A = 1 adversely impacts
the TON as shown in Figure 8c and Figure 8g, respectively.
In contrast, the increase in the frequency of occurence of
τ∗A = 0 and τ
∗
A = 1 adversely impacts the AON as shown
in Figure 8b and Figure 8f, respectively. In addition, we also
observe that the empirical frequency of successful transmission
for the AON increases with increase in nodes in the TON
and that for the TON increases with increase in nodes in the
AON. Such a behavior can be credited to the self-contention
effect, discussed in Section IV-B, which forces a network to
be conservative, therefore, benefitting the competing network.
Impact of σC on network payoffs in repeated game with
cooperation: Figure 9 shows the average discounted payoff of
the TON and the AON when networks cooperate. As shown
in Figure 9, while the impact of length of collision slot is
insignificant on the payoff of the TON when networks obey
the recommendation of the coordination device PR, the payoff
of the AON decreases with increase in the length of collision
slot as α→ 1 and PR → 0.
Figure 10 shows the gain of cooperation over competition
for both the AON and TON when networks have 5 nodes
each. As shown in Figure 10, when σS > σC, for all
values of α and PR, the payoff of the TON is higher when
networks cooperate than when they compete. However, as σC
increases, cooperation is only beneficial for the TON when
the network is far-sighted, i.e., α is close to 1 and it gets a
higher chance to access the medium, i.e., (1 − PR) is large.
Similarly, for the AON, as σC decreases, cooperation becomes
PR
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Fig. 9: Average discounted payoff of the TON and the AON
for NT = NA = 5 when networks cooperate and follow the
recommendation of the coordination device PR in each stage. The
results are computed over 100, 000 independent runs with 1000
stages each and correspond to σS = 1 + β, σI = β and β = 0.01.
favorable only when the network gets a higher chance to
access the medium. Note that a positive value in Figure 10b
and Figure 10d indicates that competition is more favorable,
whereas a negative value indicates cooperation is better.
Check if cooperation is beneficial in the stage game:
Table I shows the range of PR, computed using (25), over
which networks find cooperation beneficial in the stage game
for different selections of NA, NT, ∆˜− and σC. As shown
in Table I, when networks use the basic access mechanism
(σS = σC), as the number of nodes in the networks increases,
cooperation is beneficial only at PR = 0, i.e., when the
coordination device doesn’t give the AON chance to transmit,
since in that case the TON gets the same utility as that
if it chooses to compete. However, when networks use the
RTS/CTS mechanism (σS > σC), networks cooperate when
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Fig. 10: Gain of cooperation over competition for the TON and the
AON for NT = NA = 5. The results correspond to σS = 1 + β,
σI = β, σC = {σS, 0.1σS} and β = 0.01.
σS = σC
NA NT ∆˜
− PR τ∗A τ
∗
T τ̂A τ̂
∗
T
2 2 σS 0 0 0.50 0 0.50
10 10 σS 0 0 0.10 0 0.10
50 50 σS 0 0 0.02 0 0.02
2 2 10σS [0.18, 0.69] 0.445 0.50 0.445 0.50
10 10 10σS 0.01 0.001 0.10 0.001 0.10
50 50 10σS 0 0 0.02 0 0.02
σS > σC
NA NT ∆˜
− PR τ∗A τ
∗
T τ̂A τ̂
∗
T
2 2 σS [0.82, 1.00] 1 0.50 0 0.50
10 10 σS [0.77, 1.00] 1 0.10 0 0.10
50 50 σS [0.77, 1.00] 1 0.02 0 0.02
2 2 10σS [0.35, 0.82] 0.586 0.50 0.494 0.50
10 10 10σS [0.78, 0.99] 0.528 0.10 0.010 0.10
50 50 10σS [0.77, 1.00] 1.000 0.02 0 0.02
TABLE I: Range of PR, computed using (25), over which
networks find cooperation beneficial in the stage game for
different selections of NA, NT, ∆˜− and σC. The results
correspond to σS = 1 + β, σI = β, σC = {σS, 0.1σS} and
β = 0.01.
the AON gets a higher chance to transmit, i.e., PR → 1. This is
because under competition the AON accesses the medium with
higher probability and would only cooperate if it gets a higher
chance to access the medium during cooperation. We skip the
results for the case when σS < σC, since the observations are
similar to when σS = σC, i.e., cooperation is only beneficial
when PR = 0.
Check if cooperation is self-enforceable in the repeated
game: Figure 11 and Figure 12 shows the range of α and
PR for which cooperation can be self-enforced when networks
use the basic access mechanism (σS = σC) and when they
use RTS/CTS mechanism (σS > σC), respectively. The results
correspond to different selections of NA and NT and region
of cooperation is the range of α and PR for which the
inequalities (26)-(29) are satisfied and the game has a SPE
supported with the coordination device PR. We observe that
for any selection of σC, the region of cooperation reduces as
the size of networks increases despite the threat of punishment
and the SPE ceases to exist when networks are large. However,
networks behave differently under different access mechanism.
We now discuss these in detail.
Case I: When networks use the basic access mechanism
and σS ≤ σC: As shown in Figure 11, cooperation is self-
enforceable when networks use the basic access mechanism
and have fewer nodes. However, as the number of nodes
increases cooperation is no longer self-enforceable and the
SPE supported with the coordination device PR ceases to exist.
The range of α and PR corresponding to different selections
of NA and NT and σC = σS over which cooperation is self-
enforceable is shown in Figure 11. We skip the results for the
case when σS < σC, since the observations are similar to when
σS = σC, i.e., cooperation is not self-enforceable as the size
of network increases.
The key to cooperation not being self-enforceable is the
equilibrium strategy of the AON, which under the competition
mode (see (14a) and Figure 4d), occasionally requires nodes
in the AON to refrain from accessing the medium, i.e.,
choose τ∗A = 0, in a stage, therefore, allowing the TON
competition free access to the medium in such stages. While
the equilibrium strategy of the AON under the cooperative
mode also refrains its nodes from transmitting in a stage, such
stages merely lead to wastage of the medium since they cannot
be accessed by the TON nodes. As a result, while the AON
intends to cooperate as shown in Figure 11b, 11e and 11h
over a large range of α and PR, the TON finds competition
more favorable and cooperates only for larger values of α and
(1 − PR) as shown in Figure 11a-11d. Also, as the number
of AON nodes increases, the frequency of τ∗A = 0 increases
as shown in Figure 8a, therefore, increasing the benefits for
TON under competition as shown in Figure 8c, hence, making
cooperation infavorable for TON. Consequently, the region
of cooperation shrinks despite the threat of punishment with
increasing number of nodes and the SPE ceases to exist as
shown in Figure 11i.
Case II: When networks use the RTS/CTS mechanism and
σS > σC: Similar to the aforementioned scenario, where
networks use the basic access mechanism, Figure 12 shows
that while cooperation is self-enforceable when networks have
fewer nodes, it is no longer beneficial for networks to cooper-
ate as their size increases when networks use the RTS/CTS
mechanism too. The range of α and PR corresponding to
different selections of NA and NT over which cooperation
is self-enforceable is shown in Figure 12.
The behavior, similar to the case when networks use the
basic access mechanism, can again be credited to the equilib-
rium strategy of the AON which under the competitive mode
forces its node to transmit aggressively, i.e., choose τ∗A = 1
in a stage, therefore, increasing competition for the TON in
such stages. The empirical frequency of τ∗A = 1, as shown in
Figure 8e, increases with increasing number of nodes in the
AON, making competition worse for TON as networks grow
in size (see Figure 8g). In contrast, when networks cooperate,
the TON atleast gets slots with competition free access to the
medium with probability (1 − PR), which allows it to attain
a payoff higher than what it would achieve if networks were
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Fig. 11: Range of α and PR for different selections of NA and NT
when σC = σS.
competing. Consequently, the TON intends to cooperate for
a larger range of α and PR as shown in Figure 12a, 12d
and 12g. However, the AON finds cooperation favorable only
for higher value of PR, i.e., when the network gets more chance
to access the medium since it finds competition comparitively
beneficial. As a result, cooperation becomes self-enforceable
when networks are far-sighted and AON gets a higher chance
to access the medium. However, as the number of nodes
increases, the region of cooperation for the AON shrinks
as shown in Figure 12b, 12e and 12h, therefore, making
cooperation not self-enforceable, even under the threat of
punishment as the size of networks grow.
In summary, irrespective of the access mechanism em-
ployed, the region of cooperation reduces as the size of
networks increases despite the threat of punishment and the
SPE supported by the coordination device PR ceases to exist.
VII. CONCLUSION
We formulated a repeated game for coexistence between
AON and TON. The AON desires a small age of updates
while the TON desires a large throughput. We explored the
possibility of cooperation between networks and proposed
a simple coexistence mechanism that enables cooperation
between networks and employs a random signalling device
as a coordination device which issues recommendations to the
networks to access the spectrum in a non-interfering manner,
thereby, eliminating competition and leaving the networks to
deal with self-contention only. We enforced cooperation by the
threat of punishment and employed the grim trigger strategies
which are the harshest punishment strategies in the class of
Nash-reversion punishment strategies. We used the one-shot
deviation principle to check if there exists a subgame per-
fect equilibrium (SPE) when using the coexistence etiquette.
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Fig. 12: Range of α and PR for different selections of NA and NT
when σS > σC (σC = 0.1σS).
Further, we employed the mechanism to study the effects of
competition and cooperation on two cases of practical interests
(a) when networks employ the basic access mechanism, and
(b) when networks use the RTS/CTS based access mechanism.
For each access mechanism, via computational analysis, we
showed that while cooperation is self-enforceable between
networks with fewer nodes, it is difficult to enforce as networks
grow in size, even under the threat of grim trigger strategies.
Consequently, the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) which
can be supported by the coordination device also ceases to
exist as networks grow in size. In short, competition is more
favorable than cooperation.
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APPENDIX A
MIXED STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM (MSNE)
We define τ∗ = [τ∗A, τ
∗
T] as the parameter required to
compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the one-shot
game. We begin by finding the τ∗A of the AON by solving the
optimization problem
OPT I: minimize
τA
uA,NC
subject to 0 ≤ τA ≤ 1.
(30)
where, uA,NC is the payoff of the AON defined as
uA,NC = (1− τA(1− τA)(NA−1)(1− τT)NT)∆˜−
+ (1− τA)NA(1− τT)NT(σI − σC) + σC
+ (NAτA(1− τA)(NA−1)(1− τT)NT
+ NTτT(1− τT)(NT−1)(1− τA)NA)(σS − σC).
The Lagrangian of the optimization problem (30) is
L(τA, µ) =uA,NC − µ1τA + µ2(τA − 1).
where µ = [µ1, µ2]T is the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
multiplier vector. The first derivative of the objective function
in (30) is
u′A,NC = −∆˜−(1− τT)NT [(1− τA)(NA−1) − (NA − 1)
τA(1− τA)(NA−2)] + (σS − σC)[(1− τT)NT (NA(1− τA)(NA−1)
−NA(NA − 1)τA(1− τA)(NA−2))−NTτT(1− τT)(NT−1)
(1− τA)NA−1]− (σI − σC)NA(1− τT)NT (1− τA)(NA−1).
The KKT conditions can be written as
uA,NC − µ1 + µ2 = 0, (31a)
−µ1τA = 0, (31b)
µ2(τA − 1) = 0, (31c)
−τA ≤ 0, (31d)
τA − 1 ≤ 0, (31e)
µ = [µ1, µ2]
T ≥ 0. (31f)
We consider three cases. In case (i), we consider µ1 = µ2 = 0.
From the stationarity condition (31a), we get
τA =
(1− τT)(∆˜− −NA(σS − σI)) + NANTτT(σS − σC)(
(1− τT)NA(∆˜− + (σI − σC)−NA(σS − σC))
+ NANTτT(σS − σC)
) .
(32)
In case (ii) we consider µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 = 0. Again, using (31a),
we get µ1 = u′A,NC. From (31f), we have µ1 ≥ 0, therefore,
u′A,NC ≥ 0. On solving this inequality on u′A,NC we get,
∆˜− ≤ ∆th,0, where ∆th,0 = NA(σS − σI)− NANTτT(σS−σC)(1−τT) .
Finally, in case (iii) we consider µ1 = 0, µ2 ≥ 0. On solv-
ing (31a), we get ∆˜− ≤ ∆th,1, where ∆th,1 = NA(σS − σC).
Therefore, the solution from the KKT condition is
τ
∗
A =

(1− τT)(∆˜− − NA(σS − σI)) + NANTτT(σS − σC)
(1− τT)NA(∆˜− + (σI − σC)− NA(σS − σC))
+ NANTτT(σS − σC)
∆˜
−
> ∆th,
1 ∆˜
−
< ∆th & ∆th = ∆th,1,
0 ∆˜
−
< ∆th & ∆th = ∆th,0.
(33)
where, ∆th = max{∆th,0,∆th,1}. Under the assumption that
length of successful transmission is equal to the length of
collision i.e. σS = σC, (33) reduces to
τ∗A =

NA(σI − σS) + ∆˜−
NA(σI − σC + ∆˜−)
∆˜− > NA(σS − σI),
0 otherwise .
(34)
Similarly, we find τ∗T for the TON by solving the optimiza-
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tion problem
OPT II: minimize
τT
− uT,NC
subject to 0 ≤ τT ≤ 1.
(35)
where, uT,NC is the payoff of the TON defined as
uT,NC = τT(1− τT)(NT−1)(1− τA)NAσS.
The Lagrangian of the optimization problem (35) is
L(τT, µ) =− uT,NC − µ1τT + µ2(τT − 1).
where µ = [µ1, µ2]T is the KKT multiplier vector. The first
derivative of uT,NC is
u′T,NC = (1− τA)NA(1− τT)(NT−1)σS
− (NT − 1)τT(1− τT)(NT−2)(1− τA)NAσS.
The KKT conditions can be written as
−u′T,NC − µ1 + µ2 = 0, (36a)
−µ1τT = 0, (36b)
µ2(τT − 1) = 0, (36c)
−τT ≤ 0, (36d)
τT − 1 ≤ 0, (36e)
µ = [µ1, µ2]
T ≥ 0. (36f)
We consider the case when µ1 = µ2 = 0. From the (36a), we
get u′T,NC = 0. On solving the stationarity condition, we get
τ∗T = 1/NT, which is also the solution of the KKT conditions.
APPENDIX B
OPTIMAL STRATEGY UNDER COOPERATION
We define τ̂ = [τ̂A, τ̂T ] as the optimal strategy of the one-
shot game when networks cooperate. We begin by finding the
τ̂A of the AON by solving the optimization problem
OPT I: minimize
τ̂A
uA,C
subject to 0 ≤ τ̂A ≤ 1.
(37)
where, uA,C is the payoff of AON defined as
uA,C = (1− PRτA(1− τA)(NA−1))∆˜− + σC
+ (PR(1− τA)NA + (1− PR)(1− τT)NT)(σI − σC)
+ ((1− PR)NTτT(1− τT)(NT−1)
+ PRNAτA(1− τA)(NA−1))(σS − σC).
The Lagrangian of the optimization problem (37) is
L(τA, µ) =uA,C − µ1τA + µ2(τA − 1).
where µ = [µ1, µ2]T is the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
multiplier vector. The first derivative of the objective function
in (37) is
u′A,C = −PR∆˜−[(1− τA)(NA−1) − (NA − 1)τA(1− τA)(NA−2)]
+ (σS − σC)PRNA[(1− τA)NA−1 − (NA − 1)τA(1− τA)(NA−2)]
− (σI − σC)PRNA(1− τA)(NA−1).
The KKT conditions can be written as
uA,C − µ1 + µ2 = 0, (38a)
−µ1τA = 0, (38b)
µ2(τA − 1) = 0, (38c)
−τA ≤ 0, (38d)
τA − 1 ≤ 0, (38e)
µ = [µ1, µ2]
T ≥ 0. (38f)
We consider three cases. In case (i), we consider µ1 = µ2 = 0.
From the stationarity condition (38a), we get
τA =
∆˜− −NA(σS − σI)
NA(∆˜− + (σI − σC)−NA(σS − σC))
. (39)
In case (ii) we consider µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 = 0. Again, using (38a),
we get µ1 = u′A,C. From (38f), we have µ1 ≥ 0, therefore,
u′A,C ≥ 0. On solving this inequality on u′A,C we get, ∆˜− ≤
∆th,0, where ∆th,0 = NA(σS − σI).
Finally, in case (iii) we consider µ1 = 0, µ2 ≥ 0. On solv-
ing (38a), we get ∆˜− ≤ ∆th,1, where ∆th,1 = NA(σS − σC).
Therefore, the solution from the KKT condition is
τ̂A =

∆˜− −NA(σS − σI)
NA(∆˜− + (σI − σC)−NA(σS − σC))
∆˜− > ∆th,
1 ∆˜− < ∆th & ∆th = ∆th,1,
0 ∆˜− < ∆th & ∆th = ∆th,0.
(40)
where, ∆th = max{∆th,0,∆th,1}. Under the assumption that
length of successful transmission is equal to the length of
collision i.e. σS = σC, (40) reduces to
τ̂A =

NA(σI − σS) + ∆˜−
NA(σI − σC + ∆˜−)
∆˜− > NA(σS − σI),
0 otherwise .
(41)
Similarly, we find τ̂T for the TON by solving the optimiza-
tion problem
OPT II: minimize
τT
− uT,C
subject to 0 ≤ τT ≤ 1.
(42)
where, uT,C is the payoff of TON defined as
uT,C = (1− PR)τT(1− τT)(NT−1)σS.
The Lagrangian of the optimization problem (42) is
L(τT, µ) =− uT,C − µ1τT + µ2(τT − 1).
where µ = [µ1, µ2]T is the KKT multiplier vector. The first
derivative of uT,C is
u′T,C = (1− PR)σS[(1− τT)(NT−1)
− (NT − 1)τT(1− τT)(NT−2)].
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The KKT conditions can be written as
−u′T,C − µ1 + µ2 = 0, (43a)
−µ1τT = 0, (43b)
µ2(τT − 1) = 0, (43c)
−τT ≤ 0, (43d)
τT − 1 ≤ 0, (43e)
µ = [µ1, µ2]
T ≥ 0. (43f)
We consider the case when µ1 = µ2 = 0. From the (43a), we
get u′T,C = 0. On solving the stationarity condition, we get
τ̂T = 1/NT, which is also the solution of the KKT conditions.
